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Abstract  
  
The goal of this paper is to apply the theory of the political Kuznets curve to Russia and 
reveal the key determinants of the probability of recent protests during 2011-2012 in the 
Russian regions. We apply the political Kuznets curve in the time and spatial dimensions, and 
find mixed evidence: throughout time, we observe an almost linear and positive relation 
between income and income distribution, whereas in the spatial dimension there exists an 
evidence of a concave curve. Empirical investigation of the role of income inequality using 
the latent variable framework allows us to outmanoeuvre certain measurement issues and state 
that conventional measures of income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, may not be able 
to predict protests. Instead, we use the relation of the governors’ family income to the average 
family income in the region, a proxy for rent-seeking of regional elites, which turns out to be 
a positive, significant and robust determinant of the protests. Applying additional controls 
ensures the robustness of the results and highlights the fact that democracy score and the 
economic factors are also significant. Mapping the distribution of the protests provides 
information on the clustering effect.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Empirical research of the determinants of economic growth at the regional level is an 
extremely fruitful topic, especially if we consider papers related to regional growth in Russia. 
Needless to say, after a gradual improvement in methodology and approaches some of these 
papers have become interesting examples of empirics at the regional level: Drobyshevsky et al 
(2005) offer a detailed insight into the dynamics of economic growth and convergence among 
Russian regions using a cross-sectional approach with dynamic elements; Ledyaeva and 
Linden (2008), Savin and Winker (2012) and Kufenko (2012) provide an application of a 
dynamic panel data approach with a different set up to investigate the dynamics of growth and 
convergence; Berkowitz and DeJong (2003 and 2005) analyze the impact of policies on 
regional growth and the role of entrepreneurship; Koritzky (2010) examines the role of human 
capital and education on growth; Kholodilin et al (2009) and Lugovoy et al (2007)  put 
emphasis on the issues of convergence among Russian regions – one of the cornerstones of 
income inequalities and disparities; Lavrovsky et al (2010) highlight the role of spatial 
aspects; Libman (2012) investigates the impact of democracy and bureaucracy on regional 
growth. Considering the related literature, we would like to note that economic growth itself 
represents a fruitful ground for further research; however, one should not underestimate the 
role of income inequalities and thus distributional aspects. An interesting item in this case 
would be Gluschenko (2010), because it incorporates various approaches to empirics of 
growth and income inequalities, coupled with the examination of inter-regional disparities. A 
recent contribution by Remington (2011) sheds light on the distributional reforms in Russia 
and investigates political sources of income inequality.  
 
From the above-mentioned literature it is clear that the observed increase in gross regional 
product in Russia is dramatic. The question of the determinants of growth can be nowadays 
partially answered: federal and regional policies, physical and human capital, introduction of 
new technologies, institutions and historical or geographical background and other factors 
contribute to economic growth with different elasticity coefficients. The important question of 
growth empirics is the magnitude of these coefficients. Keeping this in mind, one can ask the 
following questions: if income grows, how is it distributed? Who benefits, or, do all benefit 
equally? Does economic growth lead to convergence or divergence among regions? These 
questions can be answered partly by analysis of economic convergence, but a detailed answer 
would require more specific data on income inequality and distribution. In addition, one 
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would require a different theoretical framework and establish a reasonable link between 
growth and income distribution. 
 
One of the first attempts to postulate an interaction between income growth and inequality can 
be found in Kuznets (1955). Since then empirical and theoretical aspects of this interaction 
has been a subject to debates1. The idea that income growth has a dynamic concave relation to 
income inequality – first, income growth triggers an increase in income inequality via 
production factor shift among sectors during industrialization, then, on the later stages of 
industrialization, the inequality will diminish and thus income growth will have an opposite 
effect on the inequality – was picked up by Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), who introduced a 
new element to it: the Median Voter Theorem (henceforth: MVT). This resulted into a 
successful merger of political science and growth theory, providing a new politically intuitive 
reasoning to the Kuznets curve.   
 
The main goal of our paper is to discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of the 
political Kuznets curve for Russia. Having considered the Kuznets curve on a macroeconomic 
scale, we will proceed to investigating the determinants of the recent protest which took place 
in Russia during 2011-2012. We will thus try to find out whether the MVT-explained Kuznets 
curve holds for the given countries and whether income inequality is a significant and robust 
determinant of the recent protest. The latter question will be answered with the help of logistic 
regressions ensuring plausible results by including a broad range of control variables.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the first theoretical section 2 we will discuss the 
implications of the MVT-based Kuznets curves for the given set of countries and reformulate 
the income – income inequality scenarios, stated in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002). We will 
discuss the role of the revolution constraint and accumulation. In the subsequent section 3 we 
will focus on Russia and briefly examine convergence and income inequalities at the regional 
level. Then a data description will follow in section 4. Section 5 will focus on the empirical 
analysis of the determinants of the recent protest: we will test the role of income inequality 
proxies in predicting the probability of protests. In the concluding section 6 we will present 
the results of our findings.  
 
 
                                                        
1
 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between social conflicts, income distribution and growth in 
frames of modern economic growth theory, see section 7.4 in Erber and Hagemann (2002) 
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2. Theoretical background: economic growth and income distribution 
 
The Kuznets curve provides a solid ground for the theoretical aspects of our research. In order 
to understand how the given theory evolved, we have to consider the original formulation of 
the given theoretical relation. Kuznets (1955) was one of the first prominent economists to 
postulate the complicated relation of economic growth and income inequality. Noting the 
importance of distribution of income and savings, he related the changes in income inequality 
to the shifts of the industrial structure of income, the latter being a consequence of 
industrialization and economic growth.   
 
One might be shocked by the intuitive and nevertheless detailed explanation of the relation 
between income and income inequality, which Simon Kuznets offered already in 1955 and 
based on fragmented historical data from the UK, the US and Germany and an illustrative 
numerical model. Let us stepwise review the original reasoning for the Kuznets curve.  
 
First of all, Kuznets (1955) refers to national income, the closest proxy to it is in fact gross 
national product (GNP) or, potentially, gross domestic product (GDP). He also refers to 
secular levels of income (income distribution), which can be represented by different income 
inequality measures, including but not limited to the Gini coefficient and similar indices. 
Kuznets highlights that an impulse of industrialization leads to urbanisation and shifts of 
production from agricultural sector to other industries.  According to Kuznets (1955), the 
initial increase of income inequality is accounted for an increase of income of urban 
population relative to the income of rural population. On the later phases of industrialization, 
the growing urban population will strive to equilibrate the inequalities which would result into 
a decrease of disparities on a national scale. The narrowing of income inequalities as in 
Kuznets (1955) depends on the number of political and institutional factors: savings 
accumulation of the rich is subject to distributional reforms, democratization increases the 
role of low-income population groups, migration from rural areas to cities enables rural 
workers to work in industries with higher income. The increase of income inequalities due to 
structural changes in the economy is quite clear; however, a consequent process of narrowing 
of inequalities is conditional on at least several institutional factors. The original formulation 
for the levelling mechanism, which could hypothetically decrease the income inequality over 
time, lacks details. Nevertheless, it offered room for new suggestions including a deeper 
consideration of political factors, which could narrow the above-mentioned inequalities.  
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In order to understand how the Kuznets curve evolved from an economic concept to a more 
politically-flavoured theory, we have to focus on the MVT and its implications. One of the 
first economists who started working on the topic of political competition was Harold 
Hotelling. Exploiting the homogeneity of political parties, Hotelling (1929) applies a game-
theoretic approach and finds striking similarities between competition in businesses and 
politics: in both cases, producers or political parties try to attract the majority of customers or 
voters, which explains the observed standardisation of products and political programmes. In 
order to perceive their goal, political parties focus on the interests of a representative voter – a 
voter, which represents the majority of voters. Black (1948) coins the term “median 
optimum”, related to the decision-making process, which completes Hotelling’s (1929) 
concept and allows us to identify the representative voter as a median voter. Downs (1957) 
can be considered as the most complete formulation of the MVT in its modern understanding. 
The key implications of the theoretical postulates of Downs (1957) can be described as 
follows: political decisions impact income sources and, thus, income distribution; normal 
distribution of voters is essential for stability of the state, whereas polarization increases the 
risks of radical changes; multimodal distribution of voters and political pluralism (multiparty 
system) are preferable. These key assumptions have formed solid grounds to further 
integration of MVT and its elements into the Kuznets curve. If we recall, the original 
formulation of the relation between income and income distribution did not account for 
politics of the decision-making process in regard to income distribution.   
 
Keeping in mind that, in general, MVT is related to political aspects of optimal taxation and 
distribution between at least two different income groups (usually, the rich and the poor), one 
has to admit that the scope of this concept is impressive. First of all, the MVT can be applied 
to study democratic processes and political competition as in Congleton (2002). It is also 
widely applied as a theoretical ground for examining taxation and provision of private goods 
as in Cornes and Sandler (1996, p. 489-499) or Luelfesmann (2007). In addition, MVT 
implications are often used in economic growth research: McGuire and Olson (1996) state 
that in autocracies an optimal distribution is hard to achieve due to misuse of power; Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) have shown that high levels of inequality are associated with lower 
economic growth. Even though the MVT has its roots in the political competition of the 
Democratic and Republican parties in the US, it can also be used as a platform for research of 
non-democratic processes and non-democratic regimes, e.g. autocracies: Acemoglu and 
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Robinson (2006, Chpt. 5) is focused on applying the MVT apparatus to formulate a revolution 
constraint based on income ratios of the rich and the poor, whereas Klick (2001) in his thesis 
discusses the usage of MVT under autocratic conditions. One has to note that modelling non-
democratic processes, especially political processes under non-tyrannical autocracies as in 
Boix and Svolik (2013), requires a more sophisticated game-theoretic approach than the 
standard MVT equations. Since we have briefly mentioned the revolution constraint, Bolle 
and Sahli (2007) is another example of research on autocratic regimes: the authors focus on 
impatience2 of the people and state that the performance and survival of the regime are subject 
to this impatience. Some researchers criticize the basic elements of the MVT: e.g. Scervini 
(2010) argues that the role of the middle class in redistributive decision-making is fading 
away. It is also important to note, that MVT assumes a certain degree of political pluralism 
and competition, progressive tax rates and differentiated transfers (as well as different types 
of public goods) are also crucial for the given concept as in Rowley and Schneider (2003, pp. 
176-178). One has to note that the political Kuznets curve, which will be discussed further, 
treats MVT as a necessary element only for one scenario. Therefore, the rejection of the MVT 
simply means that the concave scenario cannot be applied, leaving the room for example, for 
an autocratic disaster scenario.   
 
Let us consider the political Kuznets curve with an integrated MVT element as in Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2002 and 2006, Chpts. 4 - 5). In Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), the authors 
present a model of inequality dynamics, where the decisive role is given to physical and 
human capital accumulation. We will refrain from a detailed presentation of the well-
established model; however, we will highlight the set up, key equations and implications – the 
latter are crucial for the empirical part of our research.  
 
First of all, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) establish a two-player (the rich elite and the 
poor) multi-period game with generations and bequests to demonstrate accumulation of 
capital (human capital is considered to be a major asset). In the first period, the bequest 
decision regarding human capital are made and bequests are received, in the second period the 
elite decides whether they share the political franchise with the poor or not, in the third period 
the poor decide whether to revolt or not, the fourth period denotes a new phase of bequest 
decisions and human capital accumulation. In fact, one can see this game as a line of cycles 
based on power-sharing and distribution through time. There are three cases of accumulation 
                                                        
2
 In case of Bolle and Sahli (2007, p. 15) impatience involves inter-temporal reallocation of income between 
long-run growth and short-run redistribution benefits; however, one can expand this definition. 
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equations in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) which we need to consider explicitly in order to 
understand the developmental scenarios in regard to the Kuznets curve: when only the rich 
accumulate, autocracy when both the rich and the poor accumulate, and the democracy with 
taxation and redistribution. The cases are ordered according to a decreasing income 
inequality, with the lowest inequality achieved under a democratic system with taxation and 
redistribution. The crucial role of a democratic regime for the existence of the political 
Kuznets curve is further emphasized: capital accumulation and an increase of the income of 
the rich would mean an increase in income inequality; however, if this increase is followed by 
an optimal taxation and redistribution scheme, introduced by the will of the poor median 
voters, this would result in catching up of the poor and a decrease of inequalities.  
 
From Acemoglu and Robinson (2002 and 2006) it follows that the relation between growth 
and distribution is non-linear and would depend on the institutional and political background. 
Therefore, we refrain from an empirical analysis of the impact of income inequality on growth 
or vice versa. Many econometric techniques would be biased due to reverse causality and 
endogeneity. Even if we attempt to treat these issues, we still might not be able to capture the 
true effect. For the sake of our research, we will take the arguments of Barro (2000, pp. 5 - 7): 
capital market imperfections; inequality in human capital (inequality in human capital may 
also lead to limited access to credit), corruption and fraudulent elections and social unrest. 
Nevertheless, Barro (2000, p. 8) refers to special cases of transition economies and notes that 
inequality may drive growth since the rich might have a higher propensity to save and thus to 
invest. Barro (2000, p. 29) finds evidence supporting the existence of the Kuznets curve, 
noting the fact that the relation between growth and inequality is mixed: poor countries with 
high inequality exhibit lower growth, whereas rich countries have a positive relation between 
growth and inequality. This would mean that there exists a certain threshold, after which the 
effect turns into an opposite direction. For the goals of our work a theoretical link between 
economic growth and income distribution is sufficient; however, it is not the main focus of 
the given paper. 
 
Keeping in mind the capital accumulation cases and developmental scenarios, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2002, p. 195) formulate the theoretical revolution constraint:  
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 is the relation of human capital3 of the rich to the level of the poor;  is the 
proportion of the poor agents; )1(   is the fraction of wealth which would be destroyed 
after the revolution (the cost of a revolution), whereas   is the fraction of wealth which 
would remain. If the relation holds there will be no revolution.  
 
From equation (1) it follows that the probability of reaching the constraint 1R  depends on 
capital inequality between the rich and the poor, respected shares of the population and the 
costs of a revolution.  
 
 So far the revolution constraint involved human capital accumulation of the rich and the 
poor. This should not always be the case and one can formulate a revolution constraint solely 
based on income inequality. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, pp. 104 - 105)4 the revolution 
constraint is given a more intuitive form with the help of payoff functions. One may notice 
that the constraint below is a recalibrated version of formula (1):  
2
(1 )
1 p
yR y   (2) 
where the left-hand side is the fraction of the average income, (1 ) y , which would remain 
after the revolution (the authors reversed the notation in that case, by indicating that (1 ) is 
the remaining fraction after the revolution whereas   is the cost of the revolution) divided by 
the share of the poor )1(   population. In this case, if the relation holds, a revolution will 
occur. We will denote this revolution constraint as 2R . It is obvious, that 2 / 0R     and 
0/2  R : the rise of costs of a revolution would lead to a decrease in the constraint, 
whereas the increase of the rich share of the population would lead to an increase in the 
constraint.   
                                                        
3
 Even though that Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) explicitly mentioned human capital accumulation, the 
revolution constraints were formed for wealth. In this sense the second constraint is more intuitive, since general 
payoff functions are used. We assume that the logic of the constraints does no depend on the nature of the 
capital, which is being accumulated, but rather it depends on the inequality between the rich and the poor. 
Therefore, the constraint can be applied to human capital inequality as well as to physical capital, income, wealth 
or other equivalents. In the reality we might face individual multi-dimensional revolution constraints 
simultaneously guiding the actions of atomistic agents.  
4
 In the second constraint, the notations were slightly modified to avoid confusion of certain variables with the 
first constraint.  
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Recalling the relation on income growth to income inequality, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2002) provide three consequent scenarios, lacking the graphical illustration. We will try to 
fill this gap with a very trivial numerical simulation using a parabolic function with growth 
and decay. The values were selected arbitrary and serve only illustrative purposes.  
 
The first case is the Kuznets curve as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, p. 196), which has a 
concave shape, consistent with Kuznets (1955), however, having a completely different 
background. The revolution constraint at an arbitrary point of 0.61 is marked with a dashed 
horizontal line.  
Graph 1. Kuznets curve scenario 
 
Source: numerical simulation 
 
Let us assume that the rich accumulate and the poor do not: the accumulation of income by 
the rich will generate increasing income inequality which would inevitably reach the 
threshold (the revolution constraint)5. As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, p. 196) after 
reaching the threshold, the rich would extend the franchise allowing the poor to accumulate 
capital, which would consequently lead to income convergence and decrease of inequality via 
taxation and redistribution. One should note that for a such scenario the MVT is essential. 
However, democratization may not necessarily lead to a decrease in inequality: Remington 
(2011) notes that most democratic regions in Russia had relatively high levels of inequality. 
Therefore, addiitonal conditions may apply.  
 
                                                        
5
 The same holds even if the poor accumulate, however, with a smaller speed than the rich. 
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In case of an autocratic disaster as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, p. 196), only the rich 
accumulate, or the poor accumulate in extremely small amounts compared to the 
accumulation of the rich. Even crossing the threshold does not change the income inequality. 
In our numeric simulation we assume a logistic function, since there would be a natural limit 
of the growth of income of the rich part of the society, otherwise the poor would face 
extinction. For this scenario the MVT is not relevant.  
 
Graph 2. Autocratic disaster 
 
Source: numerical simulation 
 
The above-mentioned scenario raises an important question: in which cases is the revolution 
constraint binding? In case of an autocratic disaster, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), an 
extremely low payoff after the revolution as in the constraint 2R , automatically meaning high 
costs of a revolution, would make the poor ignore the revolution constraint. However, there 
may be other reasons for this: the informal distribution of income between the rich and the 
poor. From the first glance we can see that the revolution constraint may be missing important 
variables, such as different institutional proxies or variables for democracy or repressions. In 
addition, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) the model posesses several drawbacks: the 
existence of the informal sector is acknowledged; however, the role of informal income is not 
analyzed; the capital accumulation process is presented in a dynamic way; however, the 
revolution constraint is clearly an attribute of comparative statics. Once considering the 
informal sector, we must include informal income and informal distribution in our equations – 
this would completely change the picture of an autocratic disaster, since the poor may be 
literally bribed with a share of the informal output to ignore the revolution constraint and the 
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franchise may be extended in an informal way. Obviously the presence of a large informal 
sector would provide additional flexibility for the autocratic regime and the related elite. 
Moreover, creating legitimation and supportive institutions as in Gandhi and Przeworski 
(2007) may extend the survival of an autocratic system and extend the constraint. One has to 
note that for this scenario the validity of the MVT is irrelevant, since the constraint is not 
binding.  
 
Graph 3. East Asian Miracle 
 
Source: numerical simulation 
 
The last case described in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, p. 197), is the East Asian miracle. 
This case is denoted by equally shared economic growth at a starting point of relatively high 
income inequality. Due to certain institutional features, both poor and rich would accumulate 
with almost equal rates. In this case the revolution constraint is never met, thus revolution, 
democratization or franchise extension is not a necessary condition for income convergence. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) relate this case to the examples of Taiwan and South Korea; 
however, with a lack of details on the institutions, responsible for such convergence. 
Potentially, one could associate this scenario with informal institutions or traditions, adopted 
by the given society. Needless to say, this scenario is preferable. 
 
Having considered the theoretical aspects of the political Kuznets curve and the related 
scenarios, we can now proceed to the stylized facts on Russia in order to apply the given 
theory. We will be particularly interested to find out which scenarios can be applied to Russia 
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and whether a revolution constraint and income inequality play a role in the recent political 
developments in the regions.  
 
3. Stylized facts on income growth and distribution in Russia 
 
The empirical observations on income inequality in the Russian regions deserve specific 
attention. These facts will guide us to the section of empirical estimation of the role of income 
inequality in predicting the probability of the recent protests in 2011-2012. We will also 
explain the recent trends and link them with the findings of other researchers.  
 
One of the first facts to be highlighted is that, according to Remington (2011, pp. 26 - 27), in 
Russia wages tended to significantly lag behind prices. A large number of state enterprises 
were strangled in an economic stagnation during the transition period because of rapid 
changes in the ownership structure in the aftermath of the privatization in 1992 and due to 
their inability to successfully compete with foreign producers, who gained access to the 
domestic market via imports. Large Russian state-owned companies often played a role of 
city-forming enterprises, having a certain burden of social responsibility (see Remington 
2011, pp. 40-47). Thus during the first years of transition many workers, who were not fired, 
have faced a decline in their real wages due to rocketing prices. For example, in 1993 the CPI 
inflation in Russia was 874.6%, the following 1994 year ended with 307.6% inflation, 
decreasing in the subsequent periods6. Obviously, during such hyperinflation it is extremely 
complicated to adjust wages and moreover, social security payments, such as pensions or 
benefits. Remington (2011, p. 26) notes that lagging wages have been a relatively persistent 
problem, even after the first years of transformation. Another interesting aspect is the informal 
background of the wage distribution: Clarke (2002, p. 636) notes that the returns to education 
or experience are low in Russia and that “wage inequalities within industries are greater” than 
the ones “between industries”. In addition, he emphasized a high wage inequality on the firm 
level. The wage differentiation cannot be solely attributed to labour market aspects, since a 
large number of informal institutions may distort the relationship of the returns to education, 
as in Becker (1994), and thus cause substantial disparities in wage distribution. Such 
differentiation can be also partly explained by the weakness of the Russian labour unions 
(Remington 2011, p. 70). Naturally, in such an environment inequalities will develop and the 
gap between the rich and the poor will increase. 
                                                        
6
 Data: Goskomstat 
 12 
 
A diminution of labour, which had shortly followed the first reforms, resulted in a large 
number of workers entering the unemployment pool who had a choice of receiving 
unemployment benefits during the job search or engage themselves with the shadow 
economy, which according to Kar and Freitas (2013, p. 12) on average was around 43.8% of 
the GDP during 1999-2007. It is important to note that even Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) 
assume that production takes place in the formal sector. In case of Russia, it appears that 
around 43.8% of the domestic product relates to the informal sector – thus enormous amounts 
of funds are not taxed and do not enter the redistribution sphere. The presence of a large 
informal sector distorts the MVT elements of the political Kuznets curve: informal sector 
impacts the whole chain of redistribution starting with tax collection and ending with state 
expenditures, for example, on public goods. Once we account for the informal sector by 
including it into the revolution constraint, the constraint will not only depend on the share of 
the average formal income and the number of the poor, but also on the share of the average 
informal income. This would require a new set of conditions to make the constraint binding. 
Needless to say, the basic idea of the MVT theorem would be violated, unless competing 
political groups would be defining both formal and informal redistribution. This is extremely 
important, since this could partly explain the viability of the autocratic disaster: the Gini 
coefficient on the formal income distribution would be high; however, considering the 
informal sector and assuming high corruption involvement, the official income distribution 
may be very different from the distribution of the informal income, making the revolution 
constraint based on official income inequality, as in equation (1) or (2), irrelevant.  
 
Since we have mentioned the problem of indexation of the redistribution benefits, one should 
also mention the pension dynamics. It is false to assume that the value of a pension only 
impacts economic decisions of one layer of the society, the pension recipients. People 
employed with rational expectations would discount their pensions since they would see this 
as a part of their future income. In addition, the younger generation may also consider 
pensions in their decision-making, regarding for example, education. According to Remington 
(2011, p. 69) the median regional pension in Russia during 2000 – 2006 was more than two 
times lower than the median wage – a striking fact. Even though the pension was indexed 
during these years, it had been lower than the median subsistence level. Of course, some 
regions enjoyed higher pension levels, for example Moscow, where pensions were partly 
subsidized by the city government. Nevertheless, an abnormally low level of redistribution 
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benefits has been an issue for Russia for a relatively long period of time, and even the 
substantial increase in pensions after 2009 did not significantly change the picture.   
 
Another fact which is worth our attention is that in Russia by the beginning of 2013 around 
18.9% of families could be attributed to the middle class. This information alone is not 
valuable; however, around 20% of the Russian middle class are civil servants, policemen (or 
“siloviki” 7) and other state-employed people8. In 2011 the total number of civil servants has 
reached 1.6million9  which has almost doubled since the beginning of the transition period. 
Needless to say, many civil servants are members of the United Russia, the dominant centrist 
political party. Such composition of the middle class, part of which is obliged to display 
political loyalty, may significantly distort the MVT, because the voting outcome for a large 
fraction of the middle class would be already relatively easy to predict. The MVT can also be 
distorted by the elements of the institutional matrix, e.g. patrimonialism, as in Hedlund 
(2005). Keeping in mind the particular structure of the middle class in Russia and the large 
informal sector we may question the validity of the MVT for Russia. Therefore, the political 
Kuznets curve scenario is unlikely to hold.  
 
One of the most influential determinants of income inequality is the rent-seeking behaviour. 
As in De Rosa and Iootty (2012, pp. 2-3), Russia is often considered a country experiencing a 
resource curse phenomenon (also known as the paradox of plenty). The rent-seeking behavour 
is a integral part of this issue. Russian oligarchs and the regional elite are one of the examples 
of rent-seeking behaviour. Keeping in mind the crucial role of the oligarchs in the economy, 
as stated in Guriev and Rachinsky (2005), one should also note that regional elites are also 
subject to rent-seeking, especially if we keep in mind that during 2005-2011 the regional 
governors were not elected but rather assigned. Indeed, the share of the Russian bureaucrats is 
often described to have a negative impact on growth (e.g., Libman 2012) and the rent-seeking 
behaviour of the regional elites and authorities was only fuelled by the abolishment of the 
regional elections in 2005. As a result, such behaviour of the regional elites could impact the 
capital accumulation and income distribution. Moreover, according to Hedlund (2005, p. 15), 
this rent-seeking behavior is relevant for civil servants and is path-dependent and was 
historically called “kormlenie”10. Needless to say, without elections, the MVT element is also 
                                                        
7
 In Russian: state security associates 
8
 Data: http://lenta.ru/news/2013/04/04/middle/ 
9
 Data: Goskomstat 
10
 In Russian: feeding or nourishing 
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absent, and therefore the concave scenario is questionable. This very aspect of income 
inequality will be further investigated in this paper.  
 
Let us briefly summarize the given stylized facts on Russia: lagging and abnormally 
differentiated wages; a large informal sector of the economy reaching up to 43.8% of the 
GDP; distortion of tax collection and redistribution, including provision of public goods and 
extremely low redistribution benefits; rent-seeking behavior of federal and regional elites. All 
these factors have contributed to a rise in income inequality in Russia.  
 
Before we try to fit the Kuznets curve to Russia, let us note that in 1988 according to the 
World Bank, the Gini coefficient for Russia was around 0.238. Since the beginning of the 
transformation the income inequality had dramatically increased. Let us try to display the 
Kuznets curve in time for Russia. In order to do so, we had to use aggregated data for Russia 
from the Goskomstat database combined with the Gini coefficient data also from the 
Goskomstat. Further we will mainly use the regional Goskomstat data. We will use a 
quadratic fit, which would reveal the concave curvature, providing it exists. 
 
As we see in Graph 4, the trend is almost linear and there is no curvature and thus, the 
Kuznets curve scenario cannot be validated during this time period. In fact, the empirical 
observations point at the autocratic disaster if we recall Graph 2, or at the left half of the 
Kuznets curve, as in Graph 1; however, what if we consider a spatial version of the Kuznets 
curve and try to make a snapshot for Russian regions for a given year? 
 
Applying a quadratic fit in this case yields interesting results. With Moscow city having the 
highest Gini coefficient of 0.505, the curve reaches its peak. Tyumen, Sakhalin and 
Chukotskaya oblast add the curvature: extremely rich regions with a low population density 
have higher Gross Regional Product (GRP) values and enjoy a relatively lower income 
inequality. We should highlight the fact that in the spatial dimension one could speculate on 
the existence of a concave relation between income and income inequality; however, if we 
exclude the Tyumen, the Sakhalin and the Chukotskaya oblast, the fit would be linear for the 
remaining regions. 
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Graph 4. Income inequality and income: Russia (1995 - 2012) 
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Data: Goskomstat 
 
 
Graph 5. Spatial Kuznets curve for the Russian regions (2010) 
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Another fact on income is a very weak catching up to Moscow. We find it necessary to 
investigate whether regions are converging to the real GRP per capita level of Moscow, one 
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of the richest regions. Graph 6 has an additional useful tool displayed: the 45° line which 
marks constant growth in relation to Moscow’s GRP. If the region finds itself exactly on the 
line, this would mean that the share of the given region’s GRP per capita did not significantly 
change from 1995 to 2010. On the contrary, if the region is below the benchmark line, it 
became worse off, comparing to Moscow. 
 
Graph 6. Catching up to Moscow 
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Data: Goskomstat 
 
The most successful regions find themselves above the benchmark line. The evidence of 
convergence to Moscow is vague: most of the regions are on or marginally above the 
reference line comparing to Moscow, which hints at the absence of catching up to the level of 
Moscow. It appears that most of the regions have a real GRP per capita lower than 50% of the 
Moscow level. However, the majority of the regions follow the richest one, rather than lag 
behind.  
 
Additionally, the sigma-convergence among regions does not exist: the standard deviation of 
GRP per capita does not decrease over time. On Graph 7 we see a sharp jump in standard 
deviation in 1998 which would mean a non-uniform influence of the 1998 crisis on the GRP, 
or in other words, some regions were affected more than others, causing sharp contrasts; 
however, in 2008 we observe a decrease in standard deviation, suggesting that the impact of 
the 2008 financial turmoil was relatively uniform for the regions. 
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Obviously, inequalities in Russia tend to grow and regional disparities are still dramatic. 
Therefore it is hard to assign a developmental scenario for Russia. Operating with the terms as 
in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, p. 196), we could speculate that Russia is on the left half of 
the political Kuznets curve and moving towards a constraint, or simply experiences an 
autocratic disaster.  
 
Graph 7. Dynamic regional income variation 
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Data: Goskomstat 
 
4. Data 
 
Let us start with describing the dataset and providing a brief description of the variables 
involved in Table 1. In order to correctly interpret the estimation one should first consider the 
nature of the data. We have included most of the regions, keeping in mind two autonomous 
districts within the Tyumen oblast; however, the data on governor's family income for the 
Karelia republic and the Murmansk Oblast was not available. The Chechnya Republic was 
also excluded due to the lack of data. Regarding the description of the variables, most of 
which have an intuitive intrepretation, one should focus on several details in order to 
understand the coefficients obtained in Table 2. Firstly, the variable “protest” takes a binary 
form of 1 (for multiple protests in the regional capital and at least one other location with 
strictly more than 300 participants) or 0 (if otherwise). This benchmark definition is 
introduced to minimize the number of false or exaggerated reports and cut off disorganized 
spontaneous events. Increasing the benchmark up to 500 participants does not impact the 
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results; however, in future we will refine the protest data set and provide robustness analysis 
for further absolute and relative benchmarks. Most of the information of protests were 
gathered on the official news portals such as: RBC, INTERFAX, RIA, Rosbalt, Kommersant, 
Lenta.  
 
Table 1. Data for the logistic regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description 
protest 79 0.3375 0.4758404 0 1 1 if multiple protest in the 
regions during 2011-2012 with 
>300 participants; 0 otherwise 
gov_income 77 50.8 282 0.9 2270 Income of the regional 
governor's family, 2010, 
millions of roubles^, rounded 
up from the income 
declarations 
ln_gov_income 77 15.52832 1.249073 13.71015 21.54234 Logarithm of the income of the 
regional governor’s family, 
2011 
gini_100 79 39.18481 2.565605 35.6 50.5 Gini coefficient * 100 
avg_income 79 393 251.4 144 227.2 186 576 1 057 224 Average annual family income, 
2010, roubles 
ln(gov_income/ 
agv_income) 
77 2.702399 1.248641 1.237599 8.725481 Ratio 
democ 79 29.01266 6.28489 17 45 Carnegie Center democracy 
index for the Russian regions, 
2000-2004 average 
crisis_100 79 4.17484 11.66174 -29.45185 30.74398 Real GRP change after the 
crisis in 2008 * 100 
ln_distmsc 79 7.065677 1.505416 0 9.382275 Spatial distance to Moscow, 
logarithm of kilometres 
Data: Goskomstat, Carnegie Center, Vedomosti.ru, news sources, matrix of distances by Abramov (1965) 
^ The income of the regional governor's family is rounded up to millions in the table for presentation purposes. In the 
estimations full values were used. 
 
The information obtained from the federal and regional news networks suggests that the 
protests, as identified in terms of our approach, during 2011-2012 took place in: the Ivanovo 
oblast, the Moskovskaya oblast, the Tulskaya oblast, Moscow city, the Arkhangelskaya 
oblast, the Vologodskaya oblast, the Kaliningradskaya oblast, the Pskovskaya oblast, Saint-
Petersburg, the Krasnodarskaya oblast, the Astrakhanskaya oblast, the Volgogradskaya oblast, 
the Rostovskaya oblast, the Bashkortastan, the Tatarstan, the Udmurt republics, the Permskiy 
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krai, the Nizhegorodskaya oblast, the Samarskaya oblast, the Sverdlovskaya oblast, the 
Tyumen oblast, the Chelyabinskaya oblast, the Altaiskiy krai, the Irkutskaya oblast, the 
Novosibirskaya oblast, the Tomskaya oblast, the Primorskaya oblast. In fact around 34% of 
the regions were to a certain extent involved in protests and most of the protests occurred in 
the time frame between December 2011 and December 2012. Secondly, one should note that 
the income of the regional governors is derived from the tax declarations (available on the 
websites of regional administrations) and from the Vedomosti.ru database11 . This value 
represents the total nominal family income of the governor, namely the income of the 
governor and his wife. The reason is trivial: let us take the income of Vladimir Gruzdev, the 
governor of the Tula oblast, for the year 2010: in this year he earned 444.6 millions of roubles 
(or 10.029 millions of euros); however, the family income in 2010 was significantly higher: 2 
268.4 millions of roubles (56.24  millions of euros). A similar situation is observed in the 
Primorskiy kray where Sergey Dar’kin earned 3.5 million of roubles (or 87 thousands of 
euoros) in 2010, whereas his wife earned 1 072 millions of roubles (or 26.5 millions of euros). 
The official exchange rates were taken from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)12. The fact 
that the wives of Russian governors are occassionally more successful can be explained by the 
fact that according to the Russian law civil servants are restricted to engage themselves in 
private business activities. Needless to say, they may be able to outmaneuvre this restriction 
and delegate such activities to their closest relatives. Thus, the income of the governor alone 
would not be representative. The rent-seeking behavour is highly persistent in Russia, being a 
consequence of the resource curse and historical path dependence. Regional governors are 
perfect examples of it, keeping in mind that in the period 2005 – 2011 the governors were 
assigned and not elected. Libman et al. (2012, p. 529) have compared Russian governors with 
“roving bandits”. In our models, we also use the relation of the governor's family income to 
average family income as a proxy for income inequality and social impatience or tension: a 
Gini coefficient is a distant macroeconomic measure published post factum and with a 
substantial delay, whereas the governor’s income is publically available once the related tax 
declaration is submitted and thus the poor can be informed about the income of the rich. 
Moreover, the submission deadline of tax declaration is usually on the 1st of April for the last 
calendar year, e.g. the 1st April 2011 for the calendar year 2010, which makes it a reasonable 
variable for predicting the protests of 2011-2012. The variable “democ” represents the impact 
of civil liberties and political rights on predicting the probability of the protests. Another 
                                                        
11
 Data: Vedomosti.ru; http://www.vedomosti.ru/special/incomes-governors.shtml 
12
 http://cbr.ru/currency_base/ 
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interesting variable is “crisis”, which captures the impact of the recent global financial crisis 
on the protests: here we take the first growth rate of the real GRP per capita after 2008, when 
the crisis started. Distance to Moscow is added to investigate the role of the spatial factor. 
Variables “gini” and “crisis” are multiplied by 100 to simplify the calculation of the marginal 
effects. The marginal effects as in Wooldridge (2002, p. 465 – 470) are calculated at the 
means of the explanatory variables. It is crucial to note that marginal effects of variables 
which were transformed into logarithms would represent elasticities, in other words, for such 
variables dy/dx would represent the percentage change in the probability if the explanatory 
variable changes by 1%. For other variables dy/dx denotes the marginal effect on the 
probability after a change in the explanatory variable by 1 point.  
 
5. Empirical strategy, analysis of protests and results 
 
Having discussed sharp income and output disparities and main reasons for growing income 
inequality in Russia, we now have to proceed in our analysis and investigate whether income 
inequality is responsible for the recent protests during 2011-2012.  
 
At the first glance at the map, which displays the distribution of Gini coefficient and protests 
in a binary form, one could notice that in most occasions the protests tend to arise in the 
regions where income inequality is relatively high; however, this conclusion is highly 
speculative without a robust empirical proof. In order to investigate the impact of the income 
inequality on the probability of protests, we applied a latent variable approach as in 
Wooldridge (2002, Chpt. 15, p. 458) and a logit regression based on three models to ensure 
the robustness of our results. The last model has two specifications: with outliers and without. 
In addition, we will control for the effects of democracy, economic depression and the spatial 
factor. The latter would help us to check whether the protests were centralized. From Map 1 it 
follows that a certain clustering effect of the protests can be observed.  
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Map 1. Income distribution (2010) and protests (2011-2012) 
 
 
Data: Goskomstat 
 
 
The empirical approach which was selected to analyze the role of income inequalities in 
determining the probability of protests, is derived from the latent variable framework, as in 
Wooldridge (2002, pp. 458-459):  
0
0
0
1   ifprotestprotestprotest  (3) 
Let us assume that there is a variable  , signaling that the constraint is reached, which is a 
result of the following equation  
(1 )
1 p
y y    if we recall the revolution constraint from 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, pp. 104 - 105). Then if 0  , it would mean that the payoff 
of the poor after the revolution is higher than the income of the poor without the revolution. 
Therefore, in this case the constraint is binding, whereas if 0  , the payoff after the 
revolution is lower than the income of the poor without the revolution. The protests are only 
the “tip of the iceberg”, observable consequences of latent processes of capital accumulation 
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and dynamic income inequalities and they may not necessarily lead to a revolution.  A similar 
approach to protests was mentioned in Manukyan (2011), and Bozzoli and Brück (2011). In 
the latter case the authors used a multinomial logit to analyse determinants of different grades 
of participation in the protests in the Ukraine. Empirical works on the recent protests in 
Russia are scarce. Sobolev (2012, p. 17) uses the opposition reports and the police data to 
construct an arithmetic average of the amount of protesters. Nevertheless this synthetic 
variable automatically includes a measurement error: the opposition tends to exaggerate the 
number of protesters, whereas the police tends to report lower numbers. In addition, in 
Sobolev (2012), the political Kuznets curve is not considered a theoretical ground of the 
empirical modeling: income inequality is included in only one of the models and turns to be 
insignificant in explaining the amount of protesters. We implement a simple binary dependent 
variable in order to circumvent such empirical issues. 
One may criticize the given approach since protests may not be equivalent to a revolution in 
the terms of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); however, at the time of protests it is still unclear 
to which results they will lead. Therefore, considering the latent propensity to revolt, the 
above-mentioned framework is suitable for analyzing the protests. 
We have to make one more note: the protests, which took place in Russia during 2011-2012, 
were the effect or the manifestation of a certain problem. It is of paramount importance to 
empirically examine this cause. We disregard spurious protests of unclear nature or mass 
events like “flash mobs”. As in Sobolev (2012, p. 21), one of the causes was the parliament 
election results. We consider much deeper economic determinants, such as income inequality 
and the impact of growth or stagnation after the crisis.  Thus, we see the protests as an effect 
mainly driven by an economic cause. Nevertheless, we leave room for institutional and spatial 
variables in our models.    
The first model is designed in order to verify the role of income inequalities in determining 
the probability of protests:  
iii uginiprotest  100_10   (4) 
where iprotest is a binary variable, gini _100i is the Gini coefficient * 100,  -s are 
coefficients and iu is the error term.  
If we recall equation (3), the latent variable description, we would expect to discover that 
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higher income inequality corresponds to a higher probability of protests.  
 
Graph 8. Bivariate prediction of protests based on income inequality 
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Data: Goskomstat 
The estimates from model (4) are presented in Table 2. Gini_100 from 2010 turns out to be a 
significant predictor of protests during 2011-2012. The marginal effect of an one point 
increase of the Gini-index would result in a 6.76% increase in the probability of protests. The 
positive relation between the protest risk and income inequality is displayed on Graph 8.   
In the bi-variate framework the coefficient on income inequality was significant. Let us now 
verify the robustness of our results and add another inequality proxy: the governor's family 
income.  
iiii uincomegovginiprotest  _ln_100_ 210   (5) 
where iprotest is a binary variable, gini _100i is the Gini coefficient * 100, iincomegov_ln_ is 
the logarithm of the family annual income of the regional governor,  -s are coefficients and 
iu is the error term.  
The marginal effects presented in Table 2 are of extreme importance. In estimation of 
equation (5) the significance of the Gini index has lowered and the marginal effect dropped to 
6.3%. The marginal effect of the governor's family income is in fact presented as an elasticity 
coefficient since the variable is used in logarithms: a 1% increase in the governor's family 
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income would result in a 16.75% rise in the probability of protests. This effect is on the same 
significance level as the Gini index, but has an almost three times higher magnitude. Let us 
check the robustness of the latter income inequality proxy.  
In order to ensure the robustness of our income inequality proxies, we add more variables to 
the model: 
60 1 2 3 4 5
_
_100 ln _100 ln_ _
_
i
i i i i i i i
i
gov incomeprotest gini democ crisis distmsc urb pop u
avg income
                
 
 
(6) 
where iprotest is a binary variable, gini _100i is the Gini coefficient * 100, iincomegov_ is 
the family annual income of the regional governor, iincomeavg_ is the average family income, 
democi is the Carnegie Center democracy index, icrisis 100_ is the change of the GRP per 
capita after the crisis of 2008, idistmscln_  is the logarithm of the distance to Moscow,
 
 -s 
are coefficients and iu is the error term.  
Specification (6.1) includes outliers and in (6.2) we have excluded Arkhangelsk oblast, 
Krasnodar krai and Krasnoyarsk krai – these regions had the highest leverage after testing for 
outliers. Results obtained for model (6) and presented in Table 2 require additional 
explanations. Firstly, the Gini index loses any statistical significance, which now corresponds 
to the results in Sobolev (2012). 
Even though the results for the Gini index are not robust, one should not conclude that income 
inequality does not play a role as a determinant of protests: the effect of the governor's family 
income is significantly higher in the third model. The ratio of income of the elite to the 
average income allows us to additionally control for the average income in the region. 
Specification (6.1) suggests that a 1% increase in the ratio of the family annual income of the 
regional governor to the average family income would result in a rise of the risk of protests by 
23.18% - the effect is now significant on all conventional levels, even after including proxies 
for democracy, economic depression and the spatial factor. After removing the outliers in 
(6.2) this effect became less significant and increased to 26.82%. Removing the outliers 
improved the fit of the model as can be seen from the Likelihood ratio test and from the ratios 
as well. 
The effect of democracy in (6.1) is modest; however, sufficient to state a positive relation 
between democracy score and the risk of protests: a 1 point change in the democracy index 
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would increase the probability of protests by 3.55%. Without the outliers in (6.2) this effect is 
less significant, it constitutes 3.501%. One may assume that the Carnegie Center democracy 
index captures political activity of the population: this would be a logical explanation of the 
discovered effect. 
 
The impact of the crisis is highly significant in (6.1) and (6.2): a rise in the GRP per capita 
after the crisis in 2008 by 1% would lower the risk of protests by 3.16%, whereas the drop by 
1% would have an opposite effect and would increase the risk by 3.16%. Consequently, in 
(6.2) the magnitude of this effect is 2.84%. Therefore economic growth or downturn may 
impact the risk of protests. 
 
This empirical evidence hints at the deep economic nature of the protests. Since the GRP 
dynamics would highly correlate with unemployment we do not include the latter in our 
model and use the change of the real GRP per capita as a proxy for economic activity. We can 
also highlight the clustering effect: the results from Table 2 coincide with the visualization of 
the protest distribution in Map 1. The distribution of the protests was not centralized, but 
rather dispersed since the distance to Moscow was not significant. Nevertheless from Map 1 
alone we can conclude that the neighboring regions had a greater chance of transmitting 
protests: spatial distribution of protests hints on a certain clustering effect.  
 
 26 
Table 2. Logit estimates of protest determinants (with marginal effects) 
VARIABLES (4) dy/dx (5) dy/dx (6.1) dy/dx (6.2) dy/dx 
  Protest Marginal effects Protest Marginal effects Protest Marginal effects Protest Marginal effects 
               
gini_100 0.306*** 0.0676808*** 0.285** 0.0631065** 0.0918 0.0169988 0.0787 0.0061274 
 (0.112) (0.02493) (0.117) (0.0259) (0.163) (0.03056) (0.253) (0.02045) 
 2.726 2.72 2.429 2.44 0.564 0.56 0.310 0.3 
ln_gov_income   0.755** 0.1675312**     
   (0.305) (0.06937)     
   2.477 2.41     
ln(gov_income/agv_income)     1.253*** 0.2318847*** 3.444*** 0.2682634* 
     (0.443) (0.08601) (1.193) (0.14477) 
     2.827 2.7 2.887 1.85 
democ     0.192** 0.0355019** 0.451** 0.0350968* 
     (0.0859) (0.01602) (0.201) 0.01834 
     2.232 2.22 2.236 1.91 
crisis_100     -0.171*** -0.031648*** -0.365*** -0.0284353** 
     (0.0508) (0.00897) (0.117) 0.01409 
     -3.363 -3.53 -3.108 -2.02 
ln_distmsc     0.158 0.0292258 0.669 0.0520854 
     (0.285) (0.0529) (0.432) 0.038 
     0.555 0.55 1.548 1.37 
Constant -12.69***  -23.59***  -14.10**  -36.29**  
 (4.428)  (6.519)  (6.858)  (15.01)  
 -2.865  -3.618  -2.056  -2.418  
         
Pseudo R2 0.0904 0.1875 0.4816 0.7396 
Likelihood ratio 9.18 18.24 48.05 70.01 
Observations 79 77 77 74 
Outliers     Included Excluded 
Control for urban population         x x 
Likelihood ratio test (6.1) vs (6.2) 
      
0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Considering the political Kuznets curve, a concave relation between income and income 
inequality driven by political factors, we pointed out several issues related to the empirics in 
Russia. The three scenarios, derived from the related literature, the Kuznets curve, the 
autocratic disaster (for which the MVT is irrelevant) and the Asian miracle, help us to classify 
the situation in Russia as a left half of the Kuznets curve or autocratic disaster. Regarding 
Russia, Graph 4 clearly suggests a monotonic positive linear relationship between income and 
income inequality. Nevertheless, in the spatial dimension we were able to find a mixed 
evidence of a Kuznets curve. In order to analyze the empirical relation of the recent protests in 
Russia during 2011-2012 to income inequality proxies, we applied the latent variable 
framework and a set of logistic models. This approach was selected in order to minimize the 
measurement error, a potential issue of protest movement measurement as in Sobolev (2012). 
 
We found that income inequality proxies such as the Gini index and the governor’s family 
income and its relation to the average family income in the region, are significantly positive 
determinants of the risk of the protests; however, only the latter two were robust whereas the 
Gini coefficient had a fragile effect, which vanished after adding the controls. In model (4) 
estimations, a 1 point marginal increase in the Gini index would result in a 6.76% increase in 
the probability of protests. In the extended model (6.1) and (6.2), as in Table 2, the estimates 
suggest that a 1% increase in the ratio of the governor’s family income to average family 
income in the region would on average increase the risk of protests by 23.18% or by 26.82% 
without the outliers. The robustness of the latter effect and extremely high income levels of 
the families of regional governors may signal the presence of the historically established rent-
seeking behavior called the “kormlenie” phenomenon as in Hedlund (2005, p. 15). We 
discovered that the effect of democracy on the probability of protests is also significant: a rise 
of the Carnegie Center democracy index by 1 point would increase the probability of protests 
by around 3.5% in specifications (6.1) and (6.2). The economic crisis of 2008 also contributed 
to the development of protests: a drop in GRP per capita after 2008 by 1% would increase the 
risk of protests by 3.16% or by 2.84% without the outliers in (6.2). This effect confirms the 
fact that economic growth (or downturn) is of crucial importance in determining the risk of 
protests. The visualization of spatial distribution of protests in Map 1 allows us to report a 
certain clustering effect, since mostly neighboring regions had experienced protests and 
Moscow could not be considered as a main center of protests.  
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Appendix 
 
Graph A. Outliers for specification 6.1 
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